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dismissal by the third-party plaintiff been pending on the date Dole
was decided, his complaint would have been reinstated upon reaching
the appellate level.4 20 Alternatively, had he made no complaint there-

tofore, he would be permitted to do so now.42 1 Even under Slater, he
would not be barred from serving a complaint on another tortfeasor
who could then obtain apportionment against the third-party defendant.4 22
Though Slater represents a new clarification on the issue of Dole's
retroactivity, it can be construed as only a narrow limitation. As noted
by the majority, it does not disturb the application of Dole to pending
cases where no final judgment or order on the issue of indemnity has
been entered.423 Furthermore, it leaves unanswered the question of
whether a tortfeasor against whom a judgment was docketed before
Dole can now seek apportionment. 424 Admittedly, it would seem anomalous to allow such a tortfeasor recovery while denying it, as in Slater,
to a defendant in an action that has not yet come to trial. Still, considering the emphasis placed on the finality of the unappealed order,
it appears that Slater alone would not preclude such a tortfeasor from
acquiring an apportionment of damages provided the issue of indemnification between the two parties had not been finally determined.
Undertakings
CPLR 5519(a)(2) grants an appellant who has fied an undertaking guaranteeing full payment of a judgment entered against him a
stay of enforcement of the judgment pending the outcome of the
420 See Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 337 N.Y.S2d 685 (Ist Dep't

1972).
421 See Glomboski v. Baltimore &cO.R.R., 72 Misc. 2d 552, 338 N.YS.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1972) (mem.), cited in 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 303
(1974).
422 83 N.Y.2d at 446, 310 NXE.2d at 301, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 622.

Id. at 447, 310 N.E2d at 302, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
Such an application of Dole was considered in Lampila v. Harrington, 76 Misc. 2d
423, 351 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974), wherein a tortfeasor who had satisfied the judgment against him before Dole was allowed apportionment against another
tortfeasor who had not been in the original action. With respect to joint tortfeasors
against whom there was a judgment pre-Dole, see Welborn v. DeLeonardis, 168 N.Y.L.J.
3, July 6, 1972, at 2, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), limiting the co-defendants to
contribution under CPLR 1401 as then enacted. For a discussion of this question, see
Farrell & Wilner, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where?, 39
B'KLYN L. Rnv. 380, 335-39 (1972), wherein the authors urge retroactivity to judgments
within a six-year statute of limitations period except with respect to defendants subject
to joint judgments where contribution under CPL. 1401 would apply. Professor David D.
Siegel urges retroactivity even between tortfeasors against whom there is a common judgment. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 303-04 (1974).
428
424

1975]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

appeal. 42 It has recently been held, in Nicholas v. Island Industrial
Park,4 26 that where a third-party plaintiff has an appeal pending from
an adverse judgment in the main action, CPLR 5519 requires the
filing of an undertaking by a third-party defendant appealing the judgment entered against him in the third-party proceeding.
In Nicholas, the plaintiff sued Island Industrial Park of Patchogue,
Inc., which, pursuant to CPLR 1007,427 impleaded Jay Plastics, Inc. as
a third-party defendant. The jury returned a verdict for Nicholas
against Island in the main action, and for Island against Jay in the
third-party action, apportioning liability between Island and Jay at
40 and 60 percent, respectively. Following this Dole apportionment,
Island entered a judgment against Jay for 60 percent of the amount
of the verdict in the main action.4 28 Island then appealed from the
judgment in the main action and filed an undertaking pursuant to
CPLR 5519(a)(2). 429 Jay appealed the judgment in the third-party
action without filing an undertaking. In conjunction with its appeal,
Jay moved that the judgment against it be amended to reflect that its
liability to Island was conditional "and... payable only upon Island's
payment to plaintiff of more than Island's pro rata share.., and that
only then can execution issue upon the judgment in the third-party
action." 48 0 In opposing this motion, Island contended that since it
had guaranteed full satisfaction to the plaintiff, either Jay must file an
undertaking for 60 percent of the judgment or Island should be entitled to immediately enforce its judgment.
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the motion of the
third-party defendant. Justice Thom, relying on the basic fairness concepts of Dole,48 1 reasoned that "to permit Jay to appeal without an
5519(a) provides in pertinent part:
Service upon the adverse party of a notice of appeal... stays all proceedings to
enforce the judgment or order appealed from pending the appeal... where:
425 CPLR

(2) the judgment or order directs the payment of a sum of money, and an undertaking in that sum is given that if the judgment or order appealed from ... is
affirmed, or the appeal dismissed, the appellant or moving party shall pay the
amount directed to be paid by the judgment or order ....
See generally 10 CARmoDnVArr 2d § 70:172, at 434 (1968).
426 171 N.Y.L.J. 111, June 10, 1974, at 22, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County).
427 CPLR 1007 reads in pertinent part: "After the service of his answer, a defendant
may proceed against a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him . . . :" For a discussion of this section, see
H. WAcrrrm,
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mE CPLR 94 (4th ed. 1978); 2 WK&M

1007.01. The court did not indicate the underlying nature of the claim.
428171 N.Y.L.J. 111, at 22, col. 4.
429 See note 425 supra.
480171 N.Y.L.J. 111, at 22, col. 4.
481 The court concluded that the Dole decision represented an effort by the Court
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undertaking, would be manifestly unfair and prejudicial to Island."432
Consequently, Island "should be allowed to pursue its rights to enforce
its judgment against Jay, unless the latter stays the enforcement by
the filing of an undertaking." 433 The court's decision was prompted
by its concern that Jay might become insolvent during the appeal,
while Island, by filing the undertaking, had guaranteed payment of the
entire judgment to the plaintiff in the main action.
In denying Jay's motion to render the judgment against it conditional upon Island's payment to the plaintiff of more than its pro rata
share, Nicholas is in conflict with a long line of New York cases which
have held that the enforcement of a third-party judgment is to be
stayed until the third-party plaintiff has paid more than his pro rata
share of the original judgment. 434 A recent post-Dole decision, Adams
v. Lindsay,435 has reinforced this conclusion regarding the payment of
third-party judgments following a Dole apportionment. Despite the
existence of such precedent, the Nicholas court apparently considered
Island's filing of an undertaking as equivalent to actual payment by
Island in the main action. This rendered immediately enforceable
Island's previously conditional judgment against Jay. Consequently,
enforcement of the third-party judgment could be stayed only if Jay
filed an undertaking, pursuant to CPLR 5519, for 60 percent of the
main judgment. The court's conclusion with respect to the effect of
of Appeals to achieve an equitable apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors.
Id. Although this point was not fully explored, the court apparently felt that issues
which are outgrowths of the Dole decision should he resolved with the basic fairness
considerations of that decision in mind. Id.
432 Id. The court ordered that the undertaking be in an amount not less than Jay's
proportionate share of the liability, i.e., 60 percent of the judgment in the main action.
433 Id.

434 In McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prod., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 204, 239 N.E.2d 340, 292
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1968), the Court of Appeals held that a "third-party judgment would not
be subject to execution until there is proof of such payment of the main judgment."
Id. at 208, g39 N.E.2d at 342, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 403. See 125 West 45th St. Restaurant
Corp. v. Fremax Realty Corp., 249 App. Div. 589, 293 N.Y.S. 216 (1st Dep't 1937); Occhipinti v. Buscemi, 71 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947) (holding that no thirdparty defendant will be required to pay upon a judgment unless and until the defendant
has paid the judgment rendered against him); First Nat'1 Bank v. Banker's Trust, 151
Misc. 233, 271 N.Y.S. 191 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934). It should be observed that these
cases did not deal with appeals under CPLR 5519.
43577 Misc. 2d 824, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974) discussed in
The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.170, 207 (1974). The Adams court held that a thirdparty defendant is not obligated to indemnify the defendant under a Dole-grounded
third-party judgment until the defendant himself has paid more than his pro rata share
of the judgment in the main action. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1007, supp. commentary
at 92 (1974), wherein Dean McLaughlin concludes that Adams mandates the inclusion
of a clause in all third-party judgments "forbidding its execution until such time as
[defendant] has paid [plaintiff] more than [defendant's] pro rata share of the judgment."
Id. Adams did not deal with an appeal pursuant to CPLR 5519.
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the undertaking is at odds with a report of the New York State Law
Revision Commission dealing with CPA 211-a, the predecessor to
CPLR 1401. The Law Revision Commission concluded therein that
"it seems reasonably clear that a joint tortfeasor cannot assert any
claim to contribution by virtue of the fact that he has furnished an
undertaking... [since] furnishing an undertaking is not the equivalent of payment." 3
The court's desire to insure the solvency of the third-party defendant during the third-party plaintiff's appeal is understandable.
Unfortunately, in fashioning a method to protect the third-party
plaintiff, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, failed to take into account well-established precedent. A third-party plaintiff, such as Island,
may obtain a conditional judgment against a third-party defendant.
The sole purpose of such a determination, however, is to fix the
extent to which the third-party plaintiff may expect to be reimbursed.
The third-party judgment matures only when the third-party plaintiff
pays more than his Dole apportionment. 437 Consequently, the existence
of an appeal by the third-party plaintiff from a judgment in the main
action, coupled with the filing of an undertaking, cannot affect the
conditional character of the third-party judgment. The reason for the
Nicholas court's departure from the rule of conditional liability is
unclear. Hopefully, courts confronting similar circumstances will not
follow the Nicholas approach.
436

1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65(j), at 323 (emphasis added).

437 See

notes 434-36 and accompanying text supra.

